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2OUTLINE
• SELECTED MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE
• ANALYTICAL PARADIGMS: Offsets, 
Transaction Cost Economics, Corporate 
Strategy
• SELECTED CASES: JSF, UK Defence





– TWO RMAs: OURS AND THEIRS
– EFFECTS OF THOSE RMAs
• CURRENT COMBAT OPERATIONS
• DEFENSE ACQUISITION AND INDUSTRIES
• ERA OF RECAPITALIZATION?
• OBSERVATIONS
– ARE PLATFORMS BECOMING DECADENT 
TECHNOLOGIES?
– TENSION BETWEEN HYPERADATPTIVE 
WARFARE AND ACQUISITION PROCESSES THAT 
ARE HYPERBUREAUCRATIZED, 
HYPERLEGALIZED AND HYPERPOLITICIZED. 
4DEVELOPMENTS (Cont)
• INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE 
MARKETPLACE: Reform, Globalization
– TENSION BETWEEN NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBALIZATION
• US-EU DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
– MAJOR ROLES IN WORLD MARKET
– DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS
– PATTERNS OF REORGANIZATION
5EXPLANATORY PARADIGMS
• ESSENCE OF DECISION (Allison)
– MULTIPLE MODELS IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING 
OF COMPLEX EVENTS.
– MODEL I – UNITARY RATIONAL ACTOR
– MODEL II – ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
– MODEL III – GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS
• OUR MODELS
– OFFSETS (Udis & Maskus, 1991)
– TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (Williamson,…)
– CORPORATE STRATEGY (5 Forces, “Co-opetition”)
6OFFSETS (Udis & Maskus)
• A MEANS OF REACHING POLITICAL 
CONSENSUS FOR PURCHASING 
IMPORTED MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
• A PARTIAL REDRESS FOR THE 
IMPERFECTIONS FROM OLIGOPOLIES 
AND PROTECTIONIST POLICIES OF 
ARMS EXPORTERS (e.g., Buy American 
legislation, French industrial policy).
7TRANSACTION COST 
ECONOMICS
• BEGAN AS A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE 
“VERTICAL” BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM …
ESPECIALLY THE “MAKE OR BUY” DECISION
• SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE COSTS AND 
RISKS OF OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIPS
– COORDINATION
– MOTIVATION (OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR 
AND “HOLDUPS”)













9First “Case:” Joint Strike Fighter
• POST-OFFSET TRADE? JSF consortium 
concept intent is changing customers into 
collaborators – in search of first-best efficiency in 
the program.
– Answer: Probably not.
• TCE: Preserving competition in the supply chain.  
Avoiding the “fundamental” transformation to 
bilateral offset negotiations.
• STRATEGY:  JSF model is a way of addressing 
buyer power held by sovereign entities, by 
creating stakeholders within those countries.
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UK Defence Industrial Strategy
POST-OFFSET WORLD?  
• seems structured for a trading regime without 
offsets.  
• … but with an offsets (as industrial participation) 
negotiation template built in …
– Core Industries
– Appropriate Sovereignty
• Answer: probably not 
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UK Defence Industrial Strategy
• TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS:
Protection from costs and risks associated with 
outsourcing (importing) defense equipment.
– Risks of military dependence vs. imperatives of 
technology and globalization 
– Hedges against opportunistic behavior from suppliers 
with forms of tapered integration …
• …with core sectors in certain defense industries.
• … and significant capabilities for life-cycle 
management
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UK Defence Industrial Strategy
• CORPORATE STRATEGY: The DIS 
addresses threat to profits for domestic  
firms that globalization presents through a 
more competitive defense marketplace.
– Reservation for domestic producers (Core 
Industries) a (partial) barrier to entry to the UK 
defense market.
– “Appropriate Sovereignty” provisions are a 
way for the MOD to deal with supplier power.
13
KC-30 PROPOSAL
• STEALTHY OFFSETS?  The public details 
of the NG-EADS proposal included 
substantial industrial participation …
consistent with tacit bargaining over 
offsets.
– “Northrop Grumman's KC-45 Tanker program 
will support 48,000 direct and indirect jobs at 





• TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: 
REASSURANCE ABOUT THE RISKS OF 
A “HOLDUP” THROUGH US CONTENT.
• CORPORATE STRATEGY: 
– REDEFINING CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENT: entering the US defense 
market
– SUPPLIER POWER: US insistence on KC-X 
competition  
– OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO ENTRY: 
Partnership with Northrop Grumman
16
CONCLUSION: Some Support for 
Our Multiple-Models Hypothesis
• ALL THREE FRAMEWORKS HAVE 
SOME EXPLANATORY POWER IN ALL 
THREE CASES.
• BEST MODELS (OUR ASSESSMENTS)
– JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER: OFFSETS
– UK Defence Industrial Strategy: 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
– KC-30 PROPOSAL: CORPORATE 
STRATEGY
